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Abstract
In this paper the problem of the existence of approximate equilibria in mixed strategies is central. Sufficient conditions are given
under which approximate equilibria exist for non-finite Bayesian games. Further one possible approach is suggested to the problem
of the existence of approximate equilibria for the class of multicriteria Bayesian games.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Non-cooperative games; Bayesian equilibria; Approximate equilibria
1. Introduction
The theory of strategic games with complete information starts with the works of J. von Neumann [10] and
J. Nash [5].
Harsanyi in [3] introduces games with incomplete information, i.e. games where players are not completely in-
formed about the real-valued payoff functions of the other players. He proves the existence of Bayesian equilibria
(BE for short) for the case when the pure strategy spaces are finite. In this paper we consider situations where one of
the players may have an infinite set of pure strategies, one criterium and a finite number of types and we are interested
in the existence of approximate equilibria (-BE for short). The work of A. Wald [13] indicates already that it is
difficult to obtain general equilibrium results if more than one player has a large strategy space.
At the end of the paper we give a suggestion to study equilibria (approximate and exact) for multicriteria Bayesian
games (MB-games for short).
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the Bayesian games (B-games) and the natural
equilibrium concept of Bayesian equilibrium. We recall that in case when the type spaces and action spaces are finite
there exists a BE in mixed strategies. In Section 3 we study B-games with finite type spaces and all but one finite
action spaces. An upper boundedness condition guarantees then the existence of -B equilibria.
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2. Bayesian games
A Bayesian game (B-game for short) models a conflict situation with incomplete information. The incomplete
information is described with the aid of a type space for each player and a probability distribution on the set of type
space profiles. In this paper we restrict our attention to finite type spaces.
To be more concrete an n-person B-game is a tuple:
Γ = 〈N,A1,A2, . . . ,An,T1, T2, . . . , Tn,p,u1, u2, . . . , un〉,
for short: Γ = 〈N,A,T ,p,u〉. Here
– N = {1,2, . . . , n} is the set of players;
– for each i ∈ N the action space is Ai , and A =∏i∈N Ai , the type space is Ti ;
– p is a probability distribution on the set T =∏i∈N Ti of type profiles;
– ui : A × T →R is the payoff function which assigns to player i the payoff ui(a1, a2, . . . , an, t1, t2, . . . , tn) given
that the players 1,2, . . . , n have type t1, t2, . . . , tn and choose actions a1, a2, . . . , an respectively.
A play of such a game proceeds as follows: before the types are announced each player i chooses a strategy xi ∈ ATii
(where then action xi(ti) is chosen if ti turns out to be the type of player i). Each type profile t results then for player i
in a payoff ui(x1(t1), . . . , xn(tn), t1, . . . , tn).
The a priori expected payoff for player i, if the players use strategies x1, . . . , xn equals:
Ui(x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
t∈T
p(t)ui
(
x1(t1), x2(t2), . . . , xn(tn), t
)
.
Let  > 0. An approximate Bayesian equilibrium (for short -BE) of 〈N,A,T ,p,u〉 is a strategy profile
(xˆ1, xˆ2, . . . , xˆn) ∈ AT11 × AT22 × · · · × ATnn such that for each i ∈ N , each xi ∈ ATii ,
Ui(xˆ1, xˆ2, . . . , xˆn)Ui(xˆ−i , xi) − .
Here (xˆ−i , xi) := (xˆ1, . . . , xˆi−1, xi, xˆi+1, . . . , xˆn), the profile which we obtain when player i deviates from xˆi to xi .
Remark 2.1. If in Γ the type spaces are trivial, i.e. |T1| = |T2| = · · · = |Tn| = 1 then we can write 〈N,A,u〉 and we
obtain a classical game in strategic form with complete information (C-game for short) and an -BE boils down to an
-NE (approximate Nash equilibrium).
We will need the notion of f -mixed extension of a B-game for existence results of equilibria.
The letter “f ” in f -mixed extension stands for finite because we allow only finite mixtures of pure strategies to
avoid convergence problems.
Let Γ = 〈N,A1,A2, . . . ,An,T1, T2, . . . , Tn,p,u1, u2, . . . , un〉. Then the f -mixed extension of Γ is the B-game
Γ˜ = 〈N, A˜1, A˜2, . . . , A˜n, T1, T2, . . . , Tn,p, u˜1, u˜2, . . . , u˜n〉.
Here A˜i is the family of probability measures (on the σ -algebra of all subsets of Ai ) with finite support. Such prob-
ability measures are of the form μi = ∑sk=1 pkeak where a1, a2, . . . , as ∈ Ai , pk  0, for all k ∈ {1,2, . . . , s} and∑s
k=1 pk = 1, where
eak (B) =
{
1 if B ⊂ Ai, ak ∈ B,
0 if B ⊂ Ai, ak /∈ B.
Further u˜i (μ1,μ2, . . . ,μn, t) =
∫
ui(a1, a2, . . . , an, t) dμ1(a1) dμ2(a2) . . . dμn(an) for all i ∈ N and (μ1,μ2,
. . . ,μn) ∈ A˜ =∏i∈N A˜i .
A B-game is called a finite game if the action spaces A1,A2, . . . ,An are finite sets. For finite C-games Γ , Nash
in [5] proves that the f -mixed extension Γ˜ possesses an equilibrium point and for finite B-game Γ , Harsanyi in [3]
proves the existence of Bayesian equilibrium for the mixed extension Γ˜ . In both proofs fixed point theorems are used.
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We will call a B-game
Γ = 〈N,A1,A2, . . . ,An,T1, T2, . . . , Tn,p,u1, u2, . . . , un〉
almost finite if
(i) N,A1,A2, . . . ,An−1, T1, T2, . . . , Tn are finite sets and An is infinite,
(ii) un : A × T →R is an upper bounded function.
Let  > 0. We are interested in the existence of -BE for Γ˜ .
Our main result in this section is:
Theorem 3.1. Let Γ be an almost finite game. Then for each  > 0 there is an -BE for Γ˜ .
Proof. (i) Take  > 0. The proof is based on the following claim which we prove at the end of this section.
Claim. Given Γ , there is a finite B-subgame Γ () of Γ with
Γ () = 〈N,A1, . . . ,An−1,An(), T1, T2, . . . , Tn,p,u1, . . . , un〉,
where An() is a finite subset of An such that for each an ∈ An there is an an() ∈ An() such that for all t ∈ T ,
a−n ∈ A−n =∏n−1i=1 Ai , we have
un
((
a−n, an()
)
, t
)
 un
(
(a−n, an), t
)− . (3.1)
[So an() is -almost as good as an for player n.]
We call Γ () an -approximation of Γ .
(ii) Using the above claim we prove that the f -mixed extension Γ˜ () of Γ () is an -approximation of Γ˜ , i.e. for
each ν = (νtn)tn∈Tn ∈ A˜Tnn there is a ν = (νtn)tn∈Tn ∈ (A˜n())Tn such that for all t ∈ T , μ−n ∈ A˜−n, we have
u˜n
(
μ−n, νtn , t
)
 u˜n(μ−n, νtn , t) − . (3.2)
For the proof note that the Claim implies that we can define a selection β : An → An() such that β(a) = a for each
a ∈ An() and
un
((
a−n,β(an)
)
, t
)
 un
(
(a−n, an), t
)−  (3.3)
for each t ∈ T , a−n ∈ A−n, an ∈ An \ An(). Given ν ∈ A˜Tnn and t ∈ T , νt is a finite sum of the form∑
a∈An
νtn
({a})ea.
Take
νtn =
∑
b∈An()
( ∑
a∈An
{
ν(a): β(a) = b}
)
eb.
Then (νtn)tn∈Tn ∈ (A˜n())Tn , and (3.2) follows from (3.3).
(iii) By Harsanyi’s theorem we can find a mixed B-equilibrium (νˆ1, νˆ2, . . . , νˆn) ∈ A˜T11 × · · · × A˜Tn−1n−1 × A˜n()Tn of
the mixed extension Γ˜ () of the finite game Γ ().
Define for each μ ∈ A˜n()Tn the mixed strategy α(μ) by α(μ)(C) = μ(C ∩ An()) for each finite C ⊂ An.
We prove that (νˆ1, νˆ2, . . . , νˆ(n−1), (α((νˆn)tn))tn∈Tn) is an -B equilibrium of Γ˜ .
In the following we shall write U˜i for the a priori expected payoff of player i in the mixed extension Γ˜ of Γ .
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U˜i
(
(νˆk)k∈N\{i,n},μi,
(
α
(
(νˆn)tn
))
tn∈Tn
)=∑
t∈T
p(t)u˜i
((
νˆk(t)
)
k∈N\{i,n},μi(t), α
(
(νˆn)tn , t
))
=
∑
t∈T
p(t)u˜i
((
νˆk(t)
)
k∈N\{i,n},μi(t), νˆn(t), t
)
= U˜i
(
(νˆk)k∈N\{i,n},μi, νˆn
)
 U˜i
(
(νˆk)k∈N
)
,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that νˆ is a mixed B-equilibrium of Γ˜ (). So, deviation from νˆi to μi
does not pay for player i ∈ N \ {n}.
Secondly, note that for player i = n deviation from α((νˆn)t )t∈T to μn ∈ A˜Tnn pays at most 2 because
U˜n
(
(νˆk)k∈N\{n},μn
)=∑
t∈T
p(t)u˜n
((
νˆk(t)
)
k∈N\{n},μn(t), t
)

∑
t∈T
p(t)u˜n
((
νˆk(t)
)
k∈N\{n},
(
μn(t)
)
t∈T , t
)+ 

∑
t∈T
p(t)u˜n
((
νˆk(t)
)
k∈N, t
)+ 2
= U˜n
(
(νˆk)k∈N\{n}, α
(
(νˆn)t
)
t∈T
)+ 2,
where the first inequality follows from (3.2) and the second inequality from the fact that (νˆ1, νˆ2, . . . , νˆn−1, νˆn) is an
-B equilibrium of Γ˜ (). 
It remains to prove the Claim in the proof of Theorem 3.1. For this objective the following two theorems are helpful.
A proof of Theorem 3.2 can be found in [9].
Theorem 3.2 (Finite covering property by orthants for upper bounded sets in a Euclidean space). For each upper
bounded set V in Rn and each  > 0, there is a finite subset W of V such that
V ⊂
⋃{
O(w,) s.t. w ∈ W},
where O(w,) is the orthant{
x ∈Rm s.t. xi wi +  ∀i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,m}
}
.
(We shall say that W -dominates V .)
A direct consequence of this theorem is the next Theorem 3.3, which one can also find in [8, Lemma 4.3].
For convenience of the reader we give also the proof.
Theorem 3.3. Let E be a finite set,  > 0 and let F be an upper bounded family of real-valued functions on E. Then
there exists a finite subfamily G of F which -dominates F , i.e.
∀f ∈F ∃g ∈ G ∀x ∈ E [f (x) g(x) + ].
Proof. Let E = {a1, a2, . . . , am}. For each f ∈ F let α(f ) be the vector (f (a1), f (a2), . . . , f (am)) in Rm. Since F
is an upper bounded family of functions, the set V = {α(f ) | f ∈F} is an upper bounded subset of Rm.
In view of Theorem 3.2 we can find a finite subset W of V , which -dominates V . But then G =
{f ∈F | α(f ) ∈ W } is a finite subfamily of F which -dominates F . 
Now we are able to give the
Proof of the Claim in Theorem 3.1. Given  > 0 and the almost finite game
Γ = 〈N,A1, . . . ,An−1,An,T1, T2, . . . , Tn,p,u1, . . . , un〉
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by
f an(a1, a2, . . . , an−1, t) = un(a1, a2, . . . , an, t) for each (a1, a2, . . . , an−1, t) ∈ E.
The family F = {f an | an ∈ An} is an upper bounded family of real functions on E.
By Theorem 3.3 we can find a subfamily G of F which -dominates F . Clearly, each element g ∈ G corresponds
to an element bn ∈ An, i.e. g = f bn . Let us denote the set {bn ∈ An | ∃g ∈ G [f bn = g]} by An().
The -dominance of F by G implies that for each f an in F there is an f bn ∈ G such that for all (a−n, t) ∈ E:
f bn(a−n, t) f an(an, t) − , or, equivalently,
un
(
(a−n, bn), t
)
 un
(
(a−n, an), t
)− . (3.4)
By taking an() = bn in (3.4) we obtain (3.1). 
4. Concluding remarks
We established the existence of approximate Bayesian equilibria in mixed strategies for finite B-games. Using the
covering theorem and then the approximation with finite games, the existence of -B equilibria is established for
almost finite B-games with upper bounded payoff functions.
There are many topics for further research. First of all one can tackle the problem of the existence of approximate
equilibria for Bayesian multicriteria games (BM-games). BM-games are Bayesian games where the players have
vector-valued objective functions.
As a first approach to the problem of existence of approximate equilibria for BM-games we could transform such
a BM game Γ into a B-game Γ1 by replacing the criteria of each player by one criterium by taking as utility function
for a player a weighted average of the utility function for the various criteria of that player. Then an approximate
equilibrium of Γ1 can be seen as an approximate equilibrium of Γ . A more interesting sophisticated approach to
BM-games can be interesting (see [1,6,7]).
Further it could be interesting to study B-games where all (or all but one) strategy spaces are compact sets and the
payoff functions satisfy suitable continuity and concavity properties guaranteeing approximate B-equilibria (or -B
equilibria). For a subclass of strategic games such a research was done in [8].
Another topic for further research could be the study of BM-games with a potential [2,4,11,12].
Some of these topics are work in progress.
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